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Private Laws of Western Civilization
Ernst Rabel*
Human history has entered a new phase. That it should have
produced "one world" we cannot very well see. But that the
countries of western civilization have awakened to a better consciousness of their historical relations and the immense stock of
their common vital beliefs, endeavors, and cultural resourcesthis is an overwhelming event that should never again be obliterated. The lawyers have compelling reasons and magnificent
opportunities of sharing the great work of consolidation, cooperation, mutual understanding, reciprocal aid, universal progress,
and international scientific development. Our fbremost task is
to bridge the age-old cleft that runs through the western laws,
separating the Anglo-American "common law" firom the "civil
law."
"Coinmon law" is a popular term denoting the lNw of England
and the United States as a whole, or at least inasmuch as it is
not changed by statutes or special doctrines. "Civil law" indicates the law of all the countries in which Roman law was, at
one time, received or one of the romanistic codes has been imitated. Their territories include all of Western, South and Central
Europe, Louisiana, Quebec,. Puerto Rico and all countries of Central and South America, -the,, Philippines, LEgypt, South Africa,
Ceylon, Japan, China and Siam. Moreov.:r., tIL law of several
states of the United States has been conside'Labl7 influenced either
by French or Spanish law.
%
Study of foreign, laws and comprehensi';vecomparison of purposes and effects of the various legal systems 'affords the answer
to many of our gravest problems.
In th United States, comparative legal research has been
* Research Associate, University of Michigan. Formerly Professor of
Law at the University of Berlin, Director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute
for Foreign and International Private Law, and Judge in international
courts.
The Louisiana Law Review begins herewith the publication of papers
read by the author as guest lecturer of the Louisiana State University in
April-May 1949. The lecture on Roman law was also a part of the unprinted
lecture series, The Conception of Civilization: A Historical Analysis, at the
University of Chicago, on July 16, 1947.
The other papers in this series, "The French Civil Code," "The German
and Swiss Codes," "The Civil Law and the Common Law" and "Our Laws and
the World" will be published in the following issues of this volume. The
Louisiana Law Review will also republish the entire series of papers on
"Private Laws of Western Civilization" in booklet form.
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cultivated in an extremely useful judicial and literary work,
because of the coexistence of the several states of the United
States, all legislating in sovereignty. Out of disparate rules, principles of American law are crystallized and through restatements
and uniform state laws uniformity is growing, in better harmony
with the standardized habits of American life and business. But
everywhere in the states with the only exception of Louisiana,
the Anglo-American law is the basis. Here, a French code with
Spanish elements is posited against the background of the AngloAmerican surroundings. In this state, civil law and common law,
these allegedly irreconcilable antagonists, are parents to the actual
law. This, indeed, is an ideal place where the two halves of our
juristic heritage may be examined and judged.
Many avenues are available to approach the foreign and international legal phenomena. But an American student leaving
the familiar scene of his domestic law may prefer to look first of
all on the most outstanding phenomena of the civil law: the
Roman law whose body and soul migrated through so many
transformations, and the civil codes of France, Germany and
Switzerland. Hereafter we shall examine the famous antithesis
between civil law and common law. Finally, we ought to raise
the question whether the present condition of our laws satisfies
the requirements of the contemporary international life.
PART I.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ROMAN LAW'

On the main gate of the Imperial Palace of Vienna, the seat
of the House of Hapsburg who ruled the core of Europe for six
hundred years, the inscription reads: JustitiaFundamentum Reg(1) Introductory Note. The Periods of Roman and Romanistic Law.
The Twelve Tables (450 B.C.) reflected the law of a small patriarchal
community. But the jurisconsults from about 100 B.C. to the end of the
Republic (28 B.C.) and subsequently, those of the "classical jurisprudence"

(until about 250 A.D.) reached a height unrivalled in antiquity and middle
ages. In the early Byzantine period (from Constantine, 300 A.D.) the Roman

legal conceptions and rules to a certain extent were mixed with Oriental,
Greek, and Christian elements in

practice and in

the law schools of the

Orient. On the order of the Emperor Justinianus, the (later so-called) Corpus
Juris was compiled, consisting of the Institutions, the Digest and the Code
(A.D. 533-534). This work was taken as basis for the law of the Church
(Canon law) and was most thoroughly but uncritically studied in Bologna
and other universities by enthusiastic scholars, the "Glossators" (1080-1250

A.D.). One of them, Vacarius, was the first to teach Roman law in Oxford,
England (from 1149 or a little later). The subsequent school of "Legists" or
"Postglossators" adjusted the "Glossa" to the practical needs of the Italian
cities and obtained a comprehensive legal system (1250-1400 A.D.), which

in the course of several centuries was adopted in most parts of the European
Continent, not only as a scientific model but as the law in actual force,
though blended in very different dosages with Germanic conceptions. This

system was the object of all the following juristic efforts inspired by such
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rorum. In these three words, justice is the fundament of government, which have significance for international life as well as
internal administration, the function of law was summarized exactly as under the Roman emperors. It was not by accident that
the motto was in Latin. In the origin and .the consolidation of
the European monarchies at the dawn of the modern state, Roman
law was an essential factor.
I.

THE CAUSES FOR ITS SURVIVAL

But this is only a part of the answer to the question what
Roman law has meant to the Occident. Another part is in the
words of a Canadian writer of 1907, that "the Roman law is a
great step toward the growth of the human mind, although one
which has been strangely neglected in professed histories of civi''2
lization.
Roman law, the law of ancient republican and imperial Rome,
was essentially developed by a class of professional lawyers,
similarly as was its counterpart, the English law. In the Roman
republic, the lawyers were originally high priests, but relatively
early, from about 300 B.C., were followed by laymen belonging
to the same aristocratic ruling class as the pontifices. During the
following period of the principate, that is, the early or Roman
Empire (from 28 B.C. to 250 A.D.) the lawyers were high functionaries including former consuls and governors. The last great
jurists were prime ministers. They were not judges as were the
English leading jurists. Only their personal reputation supported
great currents of mind as the earlier and later humanism, moral theology,
the reformation, the philosophy of natural law, and furnished in its latest
aspect much of the materials of which the European codifications were composed. Around 1800 A.D. the immensely scattered laws of Prussia, France,
and Austria were unified in codes. In a third of Germany, "Roman" law
remained in force until the Civil Code (1900). These and similar codes in
Italy, Spain, et cetera, have been highly influential in most countries of the
world. These laws are called "romanistic" to the extent that their content
goes back to the teaching of the Italian doctors.
Literature:

Wigmore, A Panorama of the World's Legal Systems (St. Paul, 1928)
3 vols.
Sherman, Roman Law in the Modern World (3 ed., New York, 1917)
3 vols.
Vinogradoff, Roman Law in Medieval Europe (2 ed., Oxford, 1929).
Buckland and McNair, Roman Law and Common Law (Cambridge, 1936).
Articles (in English) on Roman law in the British Empire and in the
United States, by Lee, Sherman, and Radin in (1934) 2 Atti del Congresso Internazionale di Diritto Romano.
Schulz, Principles of Roman Law (Oxford, 1936).

Koschaker, Europa und das R1mische Recht (Muenchen, 1947).
Stintzing and Landsberg, Geschichte der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft
(1880-1910).
2. Lefroy, Rome and Law (1907) 20 Harv. L. Rev. 606.
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them when they gave unofficial consultations, drafted contracts,
taught and wrote, and in a continuous vivid forensic debate
counseled prudent little changes in the law, which accumulated
to a soberly practical, all-inclusive transformation of a small
town's law into the richest and most effective set of legal thinking the world ever knew before and for a millenium thereafter.
On the background of an empire expanding to the borders of the
known world, legal art grew in periods, comparable to the stages
of painting from Giotto's stiff beauty to the faultless perfection
of Leonardo and Raphael. The terse responses of Papinianus have
been reputed in subsequent times as enigmatic and our eager
text critics have impugned quite a number of them as spurious.
Not at all. It needs a highly equipped modern jurisconsult to
comprehend the wisdom and concentrated thinking of this classic
prince of jurisprudence, as he was called in the fourth century.
Of course, it did not yet amount to what we call legal science.
The discussion was primarily concerned with cases, quite as in
English common law, originating in the tribunals. And again, as
in common law, the case was envisaged as a problem of court
proceedings rather than in the terms of right and duty among
citizens outside litigation. But if we turn over the pages of English legal history, we sometimes wait breathlessly: will finally
the same result be reached as once in Rome? Titus has sold by
mouth a slave to Gaius for 100,000 HS., or stated in the English
manner, Brown has orally sold four horses to Jones for 200
pounds. Can the seller sue the buyer? Yes, said the Romans from
times before Christ; the answer in England was no, as late as in
sixteenth century, and has been no again from the year 1677 A.D.
On to this day, in England and the United States, when there
is a memorandum in writing, the seller may sue in our courts
for damages for nonacceptance just as in classical times, but not
always for the price as under Justinian, and as it will be the rule
in the future American sales law.
The jurists in Rome thought in terms of cases of litigation
but each of their solutions fitted into the pattern of a growing
body of categories and rules. They were eminently conscious of
the main purpose of law, namely, that of creating peace and
order. Without formulating a system, they created the materials
for building one. And this is what in an awkward and hesitating
manner the Byzantine epigones of the great masters gradually
attempted to do; and what the Postglossators many centuries
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later achieved, brilliantly in the opinion of their successors, although our own ambitions go higher.
Thus it happened that the Corpus Juris, as elaborated by the
medieval scholars of Bologna, presented itself to the educated
classes of the European continent as an enormous collection of
gnomic wisdom plastically manifested in a mosaic of single decisions, but for the first time clothed in persuasive theoretical
language.
There was much more to it, however. The most important
portion of the Roman law in the third century A.D. had been
freed from its archaic and national formalities and limitations.
A business law was established suitable for every one of the
multitudes of peoples living in the Empire. Subsequently, the
center of this world shifted to the East-where from time immemorial deep thought and legal custom and thriving trade were
flowing in mysterious richness; where the most ancient laws
mingled with Greek city laws and the governmental ordinances
of the kings, the successors of Alexander the Great; and the
Roman rule superimposed new elements upon this baffling fusion.
This Byzantine period, the period between the great classics (250
A.D.) and Justinian's compilation (533 A.D.) was fertile not only
in academic studies but changed the spirit of the Roman institutions. We have learned to recognize many Greek and important
Christian innovations, and modern scholars are hoping to diagnose more exactly ,the measure of the various Oriental influences.
We may say that much of the oldest and best proved social experiences of mankind is laid down in the so-called Roman law.
In the Middle Ages, however, this inheritance was treasured
as something more than the product of learned jurisprudence.
The German emperors of the Middle Ages considered themselves
as the legitimate successors of the Roman emperors. Justinian,
the sponsor of the Corpus Juris, was their vaunted predecessor.
The Corpus Juris was a symbol of the continuous empire, its law
book. At the same time, the Roman church based its own law on
the Roman traditions. Empire, Papacy, and Roman law were the
three great pillars remaining upright in the collapse of the an3
cient world, all three of universal significance "for all peoples,"
the pillars on which the medieval civilization rested; and the
Roman law was the only secular cultural possession secured by
the authority of both the church and the emperor.
3. Justinian addressed his "Constitutio Tanta" introducing the Digest
to the Senate and all peoples ("ad Senatum et omnes populos"), the Greek
version adds "of our oecumenicity."
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All this must explain the firm conviction prevailing from
the eleventh until far into the fifteenth century that there was
only one law, the authoritative, written, wise and eternal law of
Bologna, the ratio scripta-the embodied legal reason. The most
astonishing in this sequence of events is the so-called reception
of the Roman law in Germany, in the course of several centuries,
from the fourteenth to the eighteenth, without any historical
preparation, as was the case in South France, without any legislative act, a book in a foreign dead language.
To gain such a conquest, Roman law had developed new attractions. Two only may be mentioned. The law of the ancient
world offered a system of commercial institutions, which after
successive adjustments could support the very considerable business life of the many flourishing Italian cities such as Florence,
Pisa, Genoa, and Venice, as well as of all the trading centers such
as Marseilles and Paris, Bruges and Ghent, Augsburg and Hamburg and Novgorod. Maritime law can trace its evolution directly
back to the Rhodian Sea law; the "general maritime law" (in the
parlance of English and American courts) has been strikingly
uniform throughout the seafaring nations. On the other hand,
the states emerging from the decay of the feudal system needed
and used the lawyers trained in Roman law as administrators,
judges, notaries and advocates. The consolidation of the modern
European state was intimately connected with the birth of bureaucracy-the civil servants being selected from the ranks of
the lawyers. The Hanseatic league chose its office heads not otherwise: the secretary of the "factory" in Bergen (Norway) was
always a doctor of laws and in the great steelyard in London
ultimately the most influential representative was regularly a
man trained in Roman law.4
Toynbee speaks of an Italistic Age of western history.5 He
refers to a new era of the old Italian culture set into motion by
the achievements of the city-states of Northern Italy during the
Renaissance and continuing in the North of Europe from the fifteenth into the nineteenth century. This is quite true with respect
to the formation of law and state, although the historian does not
mention this aspect.
Finally, the thinkers in all the great spiritual movements
from the Fathers of the Church to Canonists, Humanists, and
social emancipators, have referred to the ideas of law and justice
4. Cheyney, The Dawn of a New Era 1250-1453

(1936)

5. Toynbee, A Study in History (reissue, 1948) 6 vols.

26f.
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with their eyes on the Roman law or what was so called at the
time. It is curious to read Christian Wolff and his deductions from
the postulates of Natural Law. Almost invariably, his conclusions
end in a Roman rule of law.
At present there are not many law courts left in the world
where the Corpus Juris is applied as a living statute. It is still in
force in South Africa and Ceylon. Even there, as soon as the
South African Supreme Court has decided a problem, this decision becomes a source of law, and makes the Roman law obsolete.
Yet the innumerable transformations, through which the Roman
law has gone during the thousands of years in the distant places
of the earth, are the object of continued passionate studies conducted by scholars of all nations. The fragmentary monuments
of this antique legal world still appear as an inexhaustible storehouse for the most diverse subjects. A learned American lady,
Mrs. Mary Brown Pharr, confirmed this in The Classical Journal
of April 1947 by an article on The Kiss in Roman Law.
II. SIGNIFICANT FEATUREs
1. Roman law in all its stages has increasingly abandoned
its national character; it was the common law of the Roman empire, pagan and Christian, of northern Italy, of the European
continent. In all these periods many local customs and laws
changed the picture from people to people, from region to region,
from town to town. Even at the time of the Imperium Romanum
after the Constitutio Antoniniana which conferred citizenship on
broad classes of inhabitants, many other laws remained alive.
And the "Roman" code, in substance, was less Latin than an average American Statute book is English.
It is this peculiar ability of the Roman law of living in symbiosis (union) with diverse legal organisms that has promoted
its functioning as the medium of legal science. In fact, we may
recognize at last that no legal science, in the usual meaning of
the word, is produced by isolated nations. Cicero, disgusted by
the casuistry of his contemporaries, asked for a thoroughly elaborated system of legal rules; but the time was not ripe for it, the
old city law had not yet experienced the full impact of the needs
of the empire. In the North, nearer to our times, Scandinavia and
England have demonstrated what self-sufficient laws may and
may not achieve. The invasion of the cosmopolitan Roman system
into these secluded countries was successfully resisted. When
Vicarius in the twelfth century imported the mos Italicus (teach-
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ing law in the exegetic manner of Bologna) into Oxford, King
Stephen was induced to prohibit his lectures. And the Barons at
Merton, A.D. 1236, declared, "Nolumus leges Angliae mutare,"
marking the divorce of' English law from Canonistic and Roman
legal thought. In the sixteenth century the acute rivalry between
the ecclesiastical and civilian jurists-the Doctor's Commonsand the common law courts was won by the latter under the
mighty leadership of Sir Edward Coke. Now, strong particularistic feeling is a natural phenomenon, and the British Isles and
remote Scandinavia were fortunate in being spared the continental turmoil. What the English lawyers achieved by themselves
is extraordinary. But if we look to the beginnings, we see that
old customs could not provide the logical definiteness, the generalizations and abstractions needed for legal system building.
When Glanville (1187) and Bracton (1250), the founders of the
English law, attempted to bring order into the mass of decisions,
they simply resorted to the Glossa. The Glossator Azo prepared
the ground on which Bracton discussed law and justice, king and
people, the binding force of judgments, usage, and sovereignty.
Of course, he took "logic, method, spirit rather than matter."
Again, the modern evolution of Anglo-American theory started
with John Austin's analytical jurisprudence under the influence
of the German Pandectists; and the highest achievements have
been due to such scholars as Sir Frederick Pollock and Roscoe
Pound whose broader and superior knowledge of the outside
world revealed the "spirit of the common law." Roman law has
encountered in both hemispheres as much enmity as enthusiasm.
It is well recognized that "the true grounds and reasons of law
were so well delivered in the Digest that a man could never understand law as a science so well as by seeking it there. '7 Everywhere, the transition to a new era of civilization required essentially more and better coordinated thought on the relations between man and man and on the function of legal rules than the
original development could afford.
2. Conceptions of state constitution and administration have
changed so much in the course of history that the ancient methods
of governmental organization are inapplicable. Only by specious
arguments, the doctors of Roman law bolstered the claims of
their masters, emperors and kings, through quotations from the
6. Maitland, A Sketch of English Legal History (1915) 42, 44.
7. Hale, quoted after Bishop Burnet by James Bryce (1901) 2 Studies in

History and Jurisprudence 477. See also Buckland, Equity in Roman Law
(1912) 131; Lefroy, loc. cit. supra note 2.
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Corpus Juris. A favorite device was to invoke the fragments that
in Justinian's meaning elevated him over mankind and human
law, as the mediator between God and men. We may, however,
note the legend about the Glossator Bulgarus, riding on the right
hand of the Emperor Frederic Barbarossa, while Martinus rode
on his left. Barbarossa asked them whether the emperor was not
by right Dominus, lord, of everything held by his subjects. Bul-8
garus replied that he was lord politically but not the owner.
And when Thomas Cromwell quoted to Henry VIII the sentence
that all was law what pleased the emperor, and turned to the
"civilian," that is Romanist, Stephen Gardiner for support, Gardiner told the king that it were better the king make the law his
will than make his will the lawY
3. The most lasting and intensive Roman influence has been
exercised on private law. The Romanistic doctrine offered adequate basic concepts, sharply defined in concise and consistent
terminology; mature rules; a complete system; logical firmness
tempered by a high sense of equity-all this stabilized by the
principle of civic equality. It was a law designed for maintaining
justice in the social intercourse of free individuals. Modern international law, in its efforts for peaceful coordination of sovereign states, has never found a better model.
The institutions of Roman private law, so smoothly practicable and easily adjusted to new purposes, were capable also of a
sort of transmutation. Out of the materials furnished them by
history, the Postglossators developed maritime insurance, negotiable instruments and the first doctrine for the conflict of laws.
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries such basic legal subjects as contracting by consent, agency, assignment of debts, and
contracts in favor of third persons were brought to their simple
completion on the lines of their ancient evolution, an achievement that Justinian's compilators had been unable to perform.
4. We should stress the social purposes more than technical
qualities of the law.
Germanic judicial contests were often decided through battle.
Church and Roman law united against this deeply rooted custom. In a long struggle, the medieval ordeals were replaced by
the modern principle that litigation is decided by production of
evidence. It has taken even longer, however, to regain the prin8. Bryce, supra note 7, at 95.
9. Plucknett, The Relations between Roman Law and English Common
Law Down to the Sixteenth Century (1940) 3 U. of Toronto L. J. 24, 46.
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ciple natural to the classical Roman procedure that the judge
should evaluate evidence brought before him according to his
own conscientious conviction, and not bound by formalized legal
rules determining what this or that document is worth, how many
witnesses are needed, of what kind, et cetera. Common law lawyers, it is true, have never adhered to this Romanistic view. To
weigh the merits of the excellent big American compendiums of
rules on evidence against the continental systems may well be
one of the many topics for which comparative research is desirable, with due appraisal of jury procedure.
That men are free and equal, in antiquity, was a principle restricted to the citizens, but philosophers and jurists expressed
views that inspired the modern school of natural law in its successful fight to free the serfs, the peasants attached to the lord's
land-the persons of the serfs as well as their land. "Nothing is
sweeter than freedom," said Cicero; "other nations may endure
servitude, our nation cannot." Lawsuits were decided, wills construed "in favor of freedom." Divorce was permitted because
marriage must be free. And under Justinian freedom is declared
"inestimable" in money. Freedom of speech under the most illfamed emperors shames many modem states. And it was a firm
axiom respected throughout the old empire that the Italian soil
was free. Free ownership was incompatible with tributes and
stipends and forced labor, in strict contrast with the situations
in the Roman provinces, the Middle Ages, and all the manifold
English tenures up to 1925. America has returned to these simple
ideals.
In the Spanish Siete Partidas, most influential on Spanish
and Latin-American laws, you may find quoted the Supreme
Commands of Law, 10 which Justinian took from the classics."
They illustrate what Dean Roscoe Pound has called the Roman
idea of2 a moral rule of conduct backed by the authority of the
state.'
Jus est ars boni et aequi. Law is the art of finding the good
and the equitable. Cuius merito quis nos sacerdotes appelletof which rightly we may be called the priests, and so on. Juris
praecepta sunt haec: honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum
cuique tribuere.-The commands of law are three: to live honestly; not to wrong another; and to attribute suum cuique. To
each his own! This was not just a high-sounding phrase; the
10. Siete Partidas, Part. III, tit. 1, c. 3.
11. Ulp. Digest 1, 1, 1.1 pr. § 1; 1.10, § 1.
12. Pound, The Task of Law (1944) 50.
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sources bear overwhelming testimony to the serious effort made
to bring reliable and equitable justice into the social relations.
Man is an individual with his clear cut rights in his own sphere,
which the state respects and impartially guarantees. Man is pro13
tected as an individual, not as the member of a group or class,
a guild or inn, lord or vassal, knight or burgher, squire or serf.
What it means, that public and private spheres are neatly distinguished, we could recognize in observing the increasing worship of the state in the totalitarian absorption of the individual.
No wonder that the Nazis hated Roman law. If the citizen from
his cradle to his grave is merely the leader's soldier, he has no
right of his own, and no private law is left indeed. Alterum non
laedere. Do not violate the right of others. The Romans knew
the conflict hidden in this maxim. Asking when does one injure
another, they were the first to crystallize the profound Greek
ideas of volition and action into a foundation of legal responsibility. The thought process of more primitive nations resembles
the story told in the Arabian Nights: A traveller lost in a lonely
place finds a few dates and after eating them throws the stones
of the dates away. Suddenly a demon appears and accuses him
of having murdered by a stone the ghost's invisible son. Such is
archaic law. The deed makes one liable, not evil intention nor
negligence. The Romans gradually refined their concepts of dolus,
culpa, factum, imperitia, neglegentia and so forth. On the basis
of their doctrine of fault, an immense discussion by canonists,
criminalists, and philosophers has since turned the problem of
responsibility over and over. As early as in the Twelve Tables,
the universal ancient right of blood vengeance was, for minor
crimes, replaced by fines. The state already was well on its way
to a monopoly of penal jurisdiction.
Qui suo iure utitur neminem laedit, use of my right cannot
be taken from me because it injures another. As a consequence
of individual property, you may dig in the ground all the water
or build a high wall near the boundary of your land, depriving
your neighbor of his water or light; 14 or you may blast your rocks
and undermine thereby the neighbor's house. But the Roman
rule was restricted more and more; "for we ought not to use our
right badly"' 5 and after a long evolution it finally yielded to a
doctrine of forbidden misuse of right. In contrast, as late as in
13. Pincoffs, The Object and Value of the Study of Roman Law (1881)

15 Am. L. Rev. 555, 570.
14. Marc.-Ulp. Dig. 39, 3, 1, 12.
15. Gai. Inst. 1.53.
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1895, Lord Halsbury held that where my neighbor diverts or appropriates water within his own land so as to deprive me of it,
nothing can be done; it is a lawful act, however ill the motive
might be. 16 Again, American decisions disapprove an unnatural,
unusual or spiteful exercise of land ownership.
Honeste vivere. Pandectists have said that this precept prohibits not only what is penalized by express provision but also
whatever is contrary to good customs, all that offends morals and
decency. Equity and honesty in the Romanistic tradition permeate the entire law; no barrier is erected dividing law and equity.
The Christian Byzantine sources abound with such terms as pietas, fides, humanitas, aequitas, officium.
This is another remarkable contrast with the harshness of
English common law from which, however, American courts have
in almost every instance emancipated themselves-in fact though
not in theory. Take the right of a voluntary agent to be compensated for expenses. This goes back into the earliest known phase
of Roman law. When the owner of a place went abroad, it was
customary that a neighbor intervened for his interest, and according to his presumable intention, defended him in a lawsuit,
repaired his fence or healed his horse. The civil law codes have
inherited an elaborate institution of negotiorum gestio starting
from the rational idea that, as Ulpian said, it is in the public interest that absentees should be defended, and influenced by the
Christian idea that altruistic action is laudable. In England, as
late as in 1911 a judge refused any claim for expenses of a voluntary agent, because "according to English law liabilities are
not to be forced on people behind their backs.' 1 7 Yet American
courts will grant recovery of money spent by a neighbor who
supports another's house threatened by collapse, or the fee of a
doctor who treats an unconscious man. Recovery for salvage at
sea has always been an exception simply because it belongs to
the general maritime lw, also recognized in England.
Also the history of the so called action for unjust enrichment
is characteristic. The Romans perceived the force of the idea that
transaction made in perfectly legal forms may offend the sense
of justice, and framed conditions for allowing a plaintiff to recover where his property is retained by the defendant without
just ground. The rules of the classical period were much enlarged by the Corpus Juris and certainly too much in the eigh16. Mayor of Bradford v. Pickles [1895] A.C. 587, 594.
17. Lord Bowen in Falcke v. Scottish Imperial Ins. Co. [1886] 34 Ch. D.
234, 248.
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teenth century where the maxim prevailed: no one shall be made
richer to the detriment of another-a dangerous principle which
Lord Mansfield used with prudence. But whereas the German
doctrine progressed on the rediscovered Roman lines to genuine
rules, to a definite doctrine of unjust enrichment, the English
courts disapproved Mansfield's principle as "vague jurisprudence"' 8 and "well-meaning sloppiness of thought"'19 with the
result that English law now lacks a firm theory in this field, although it once had the same conceptions as the classical jurists.
Anglo-American law has not yet a sure foundation, but it has
developed a great mass of decisions, rich in ideas, rivalling the
German practice.
III.

ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAW

I certainly do not wish to imply that everything in the Romanistic system is blameless, or that the long after effect of ancient and fragmentary sources of law always worked as a blessing. By no means! I only want to convey to you the feeling of its
significance in human history. In comparing Roman law with its
only true rival, the Anglo-American law, which looks back to a
proud and unbroken evolution of eight hundred years, we should
hesitate to pronounce any general judgment. Their formative
stages contain striking similarities, as also in the organization of
both the English and Roman empires parallels are manifest. Why
Romans and Britons knew at the same time how to build durable
reigns over other nations and how to promote private law may be
conjectured. . Not only were both peoples successful also in business, industry, commerce and agriculture, 2' but above all both
respected, in the limits of their situations, the personality of individuals and the autonomy of nations.
Nevertheless, we perceive that the influence of Canon and
Roman law upon England was limited to two fields: an often repeated inspiration to scientific efforts, and a direct incorporation
of rules into some special branches of law administered by special
courts: ecclesiastical, chancery, admiralty, and probate courts,
and the law merchant. The true common law as pronounced by
the Kings Bench impresses foreign jurists as entirely peculiar
because of its quaint Norman-Latin-French terminology, vener18. Lord Sumner in Sinclair v. Brougham [1914] A.C. 398. Cf. Lord
Wright, Legal Essays and Addresses 1.
19. Lord Scrutton in Holt v. Markham [1923] 1 K.B. 504, 513.
20. No explanation seems possible to Koschaker, supra note 1, at 82.
21. William H. Page, Statutes as Common Law Principles (1944) Wis.
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able formulas, remainders of feudalism, a law made by great
judges rather than codes, the inductive approach and pragmatic
outlook, a very special atmosphere. It is a most imposing, mature
product grown by an indigenous, continuous discipline.
However, by indirect radiation from the science of Roman,
Byzantine, Italian, French, Dutch and German scholars, incessant
work went on through the centuries. This source of inspiration
has been attested by the regii professores in Oxford and Cambridge who have been teaching "civil law" from Henry VIII to
this day. Roman law, strong in Scotland, has made itself felt also
in the United States. No doubt, teaching and studying of Roman
sources is not usual in many American law schools and is in
eclipse also in most other countries. Its value, however, is not
exhausted, either as a unique history of legal thought, or as an
immensely suggestive object of comparative research.
This should be recognized in this country even more readily
than in England. The United States has undergone a radical development toward a more universal legal pattern. From the beginning, English feudalism could not root here. The great variety
of conditions in the vast and expanding country and the amalgamation of French and Spanish elements favored the same trend
away from old English law. The tremendous effects of the machine age continued this approach to the outer world. We may
think of one particularly attractive illustration: The "Nolumus"
of the Barons in Merton was occasioned by the desire of the
church to achieve recognition of the legitimation of children born
out of wedlock through subsequent marriage of the parents, an
institution of imperial Roman law. England denied it until 1926
A.D. But in the United States, all but three state statutes have
successively adopted such legitimation, since Virginia introduced
it in 1785.

